Enugu Air flight ENU4264 overran the runway at Benin Airport after landing with a failed autobrake, wet runway and tailwind, exposing wider airport safety gaps at the facility.
The Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau (NSIB) in its preliminary report said the crew knew the autobrake was unavailable and planned to rely on manual braking. That challenge was compounded by a wet runway, rain, reduced visibility and a significant tailwind during the landing.
The preliminary report also exposes wider airport safety gaps at Oba Akenzua II Airport, Benin. These include deficiencies involving runway-condition information, weather displays, tower visibility and fixed structures beyond the runway.
The Enugu Air flight was a scheduled passenger service ENU4264 from Lagos to Benin on July 23, 2026. There were 63 passengers and five crew members aboard the Embraer 170.
The First Officer was the Pilot Flying, while the captain was the Pilot Monitoring.
NSIB has issued four immediate recommendations after its preliminary assessment. Recommendation A-2026-039 requires the removal of fixed concrete structures from the decommissioned localizer installation at the end of Runway 05.
Recommendation A-2026-040 requires unrestricted tower visibility over the aerodrome’s movement areas. Recommendation A-2026-041 directs the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) to provide the Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) with a suitable tower location.
The fourth, A-2026-042, requires the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) to restore and maintain the weather information display in the control tower.
Taken together, the four recommendations reveal that the investigation so far has found more than a difficult landing. They point to airport safety gaps affecting the information available to crews and the physical environment surrounding the runway.
Failed autobrake became a critical landing factor
The autobrake issue deserves attention because it was known before touchdown. During the approach briefing, the First Officer stated that the aircraft’s autobrake system was not working.
The crew therefore planned to use manual braking after landing. That decision did not automatically make the landing unsafe. However, it became an important factor when combined with the wet runway, tailwind and the aircraft’s touchdown point.
The crew had monitored weather conditions and expressed concern about rain around the airport. At 14:42, Benin Tower advised that the approach path to Runway 05 appeared cloudy.
The tower also advised that the approach path to Runway 23 appeared better. The crew nevertheless continued with the RNAV approach to Runway 05.
The weather then deteriorated further.
At 14:48, the tower advised the crew that visibility was approximately 1,500 metres in moderate rain. Five minutes later, the landing clearance warned the crew that the runway surface was wet. The crew continued after acquiring the required visual reference.
That created a difficult combination. The aircraft was approaching a wet runway while the autobrake was unavailable. The crew also had to manage reduced visibility and rain during the final stages of the approach.
Airport safety gaps emerged alongside the failed autobrake
The flight data recorder showed another significant factor. The aircraft encountered a tailwind during the approach and landing.
NSIB calculated approximately 12 knots of tailwind at the runway threshold. The tailwind was about 6.4 knots at touchdown.
Tailwind can increase groundspeed and therefore affect the amount of runway required to stop. That becomes particularly important when runway conditions are wet and automatic braking assistance is unavailable.
The aircraft touched down approximately 1,641.5 metres from the threshold of Runway 05. Its recorded groundspeed was about 138 knots.
The runway’s published Landing Distance Available was 2,400 metres.
That left a relatively limited amount of runway beyond the touchdown point. The aircraft subsequently continued beyond the runway end.
It crossed the runway-end blast pad and entered the unpaved area beyond the runway. It then struck approach-lighting installations and two fixed concrete structures associated with a decommissioned localizer installation.
The landing-gear assemblies broke away after the impacts.
The accident was nevertheless survivable. All 68 occupants evacuated without injury. There was also no post-impact fire.
The preliminary findings do not establish that the failed autobrake alone caused the runway excursion. Instead, NSIB is examining how the different factors interacted.
That distinction is important.
The investigation is not simply about an aircraft landing with an unserviceable system. It is about the combined effect of aircraft condition, runway surface, wind, weather, crew decisions and airport infrastructure.
Four recommendations expose serious airport safety gaps
The first immediate recommendation, A-2026-039, concerns the fixed structures beyond Runway 05.
NSIB wants the NCAA to ensure FAAN removes the fixed structures belonging to the decommissioned localizer installation. The recommendation follows the aircraft’s impact with two concrete structures after leaving the runway.
The second recommendation, A-2026-040, concerns the control tower. NCAA is required to ensure the tower is positioned to provide an unrestricted view of all movement areas.
The third recommendation, A-2026-041, is directed at FAAN. The agency is required to provide NAMA with a suitable control-tower location that allows unrestricted visibility.
The fourth recommendation, A-2026-042, concerns meteorological information. NiMet is required to restore and maintain the weather information display equipment in Benin Tower.
The recommendations are particularly significant because they address hazards that existed outside the aircraft itself.
They also show why the airport safety gaps cannot be separated from the runway excursion.
The Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) is responsible for aviation safety regulation and oversight in Nigeria, including airport, airspace and meteorological services oversight.
Runway-condition information also came under scrutiny
NSIB found another important information gap concerning the runway.
Although air traffic control advised the crew that the runway was wet, the landing clearance did not include a Runway Condition Report or Runway Condition Code.
The preliminary report further states that the reviewed ATC communications contained no transmission of an RCR or RWYCC to the aircraft.
That finding matters because runway condition information can influence a crew’s assessment of landing risk. In this case, the crew already knew the runway was wet and the autobrake was unavailable.
However, the report raises questions about whether the crew received all the available runway-condition information required for its landing assessment.
This forms another layer of the airport safety gaps identified by investigators.
The investigation will examine how runway-condition information was collected, processed and communicated. It will also assess implementation of the Global Reporting Format.
Weather information adds another concern
Meteorological information also featured prominently in the preliminary findings.
A SPECI issued at 13:37 UTC recorded visibility of 1,600 metres in moderate rain. However, the Air Traffic Operations Manager’s report stated that the 13:00 UTC METAR was the only meteorological report provided to the DATCO up to the occurrence.
At the same time, the airport’s weather information display system was listed as unserviceable on the day.
That created an information challenge during an arrival already affected by rain and reduced visibility.
The control tower also had an infrastructure problem. An incomplete building beyond the end of Runway 05 obstructed the tower’s line of sight towards that part of the aerodrome.
Therefore, the airport safety gaps extended from weather information to tower visibility and runway-end infrastructure.
NSIB will examine the crew’s decisions
NSIB has emphasised that its investigation is intended to prevent future accidents. The preliminary findings do not represent the final conclusions.
However, the bureau will examine the crew’s training, experience and operational decision-making. It will also review the applicable Enugu Air procedures.
The investigation will assess how the crew responded to the failed autobrake and the changing weather conditions. It will also examine runway-condition reporting and the use of meteorological information.
NSIB is expected to continue examining the wreckage and landing-gear separation. Investigators will also study ground marks, the impact sequence and runway-end infrastructure.
Those areas could help establish how the aircraft’s stopping performance developed after touchdown.
A difficult landing became a wider safety warning
The preliminary findings present a layered picture of the ENU4264 runway excursion.
The failed autobrake was a known aircraft-system limitation. The crew planned for manual braking, but the landing also involved a wet runway, rain, reduced visibility and tailwind.
The aircraft touched down about 1,641.5 metres into a runway with 2,400 metres of Landing Distance Available. It then overran the runway and struck structures beyond the runway end.
Yet the most striking finding may be what happened around the aircraft.
NSIB’s four immediate recommendations point to fixed hazards beyond the runway, restricted tower visibility and inadequate weather-information equipment. The investigation also identified concerns about runway-condition reporting.
In other words, the preliminary report identifies airport safety gaps that existed before ENU4264 crossed the runway threshold.
The final investigation will determine the relative contribution of each of the airport safety gaps. It will establish whether the failed autobrake, landing conditions, aircraft performance, crew decisions or airport deficiencies played decisive roles.
