ACCIDENT Investigation Bureau (AIB) today published finished reports on four accidents that occurred between 2011 and 2015 implying that it has made 17 safety recommendations from the accidents of which a vast majority of the recommendations made have been adhered to by the parties.
This is just as one of the four airlines has said that it has implemented all the safety recommendations demanded of it assuring that the safety was its top priority.
Commissioner AIB, Engineer Akin Olateru who made these known in his office today said the reports published were Report on the Serious Incident involving Presidential Implementation Committee on Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS), Report on the Accident Involving OAS Helicopters (Nig)Limited.
Others according to Olateru were Report of the Accident involving Dana Airlines and Report on the Serious Incident Involving Bristow Helicopters Limited.
Reading from the report of the OAS Helicopter crash, Olateru said the Ecuruiel A 350 B2 Helicopter with Registration 5NBKA which crashed at Oke-Oba Hill, Ikonifin, Osun State, Nigeria on 29th July, 2011 was caused by the non-adherence of the Pilot to Visual Flight Rules of clear-of cloud and obstacles while maintaining ground contact at all times led to Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT).
The AIB boss listed contributory factors to include the fact that the pilot was not Instrument rated and that he (pilot) lacked route familiarization.
He however said five safety recommendations were made three of which were targeted at NCAA; one at NAMA; and one to Nigerian Police Force.
On the Report on the Serious Incident involving Presidential Implementation Committee on Maritime Safety and Security (PICOMSS) with Registration 5N-BKS at Benin Airport Edo State Nigeria on 5th July, 2012.
The AIB boss said the cause of the crash was the decision of the crew to continue the glide approach despite repeated landing gear warnings with the power lever below 25% rather than initiating a Go-around.
According to Olateru other contributory factors include the failure of the crew to recognize the landing gear warnings, no Standard Operating Procedure/Training Policy in place, the crew low hours and experience, coupled with the rostering of two pilots with same capability on a training flight as well as lack of Crew Resource Management (CRM) training.
The AIB Commissioner said two safety recommendations were made of which one was directed to NCAA; and the other to the Nigerian Police Force.
On the Dana June3 2012 crash, the AIB said the causal factors included the fact that the aircraft engine number 1 lost power seventeen minutes into the flight, and thereafter on final approach, Engine number 2 lost power and failed to respond to throttle movement on demand for increased power to sustain the aircraft in its flight configuration.
The investigator also fingered inappropriate omission of the use of the Checklist, and the crew’s inability to appreciate the severity of the power-related problem, and their subsequent failure to land at the nearest suitable airfield.
They also pinpointed lack of situation awareness, inappropriate decision making, and poor airmanship.
According to the AIB, eight safety recommendations were made of which 4 in numbers wherein 3 was targeted to Dana Airlines and all were accepted and closed one was to NCAA, accepted and closed.
There were also four (4) Safety Recommendations made in the published one of which is to FAA targeting Pratt & Whitney the engine manufacturer; one to Dana Airlines; one to NCAA (with 3 safety recommendations in one); and one to NAMA on Quality Assurance Management.
On the Sirkorsky Helicopter belonging to Bristow with registration 5N-BOA, S-92, the AIB said the investigation identified the following causal and contributory factor: 115v cable loom chafed and arced with hydraulic pipeline, puncturing it and causing a high pressure leak which ignited on contact with hot surface of the Right Hand heat exchanger, resulting in fire on the Upper Deck.
The investigator also listed two contributory factors: the effectivity of the aircraft was excluded in the Alert Service Bulletin ASB No. 92-20-002A issued by the manufacturer and the Technical Directive TD-S92A-29-99 did not include Check/Inspection of the right hand side of the Upper Deck.
The Bureau also issued two safety recommendations both targeted to Bristow Helicopters.
Bristow Helicopters Nigeria Limited issued a Technical Directive, TD-S92A-29-104
Meanwhile, in a swift reaction, Dana Air stated,”We wish to also state that Dana Air swung into action immediately the Interim Safety Recommendations were released in 2013 and as an airline strictly committed to the safety and comfort of its guests, we implemented all the recommendations same year, as released by AIB.”
“ We did not stop at just implementing the recommendations; we also successfully passed an operational audit conducted by the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority’s Flight Safety Group and its foreign partners.”
“In 2016, after another rigorous operational audit, Dana Air was admitted into the IOSA register to underscore its strict adherence to global management and safety standards and procedures required of global carriers.”
“While we acknowledge the full report, and will continue to review it, we are glad that the report confirmed that the aircraft was airworthy at the time of departure, flight crew were certified and that we have cleared all defects during their last check.”
“Dana Air maintains a rich spare parts store to date and we have doubled our maintenance and safety efforts with constant training and retraining of our crew and ground staff. This has led to our continuous provision of reliable air transport operation and a record 4.5 million passengers flown in the last 8 years of our operation.”
“The safety and comfort of our guests remains a top priority to us and may the beautiful souls of the crew and guests we lost at the unfortunate accident continue to rest in peace- Amen. They remain forever in our hearts and our prayers and thoughts will continue to be with their friends and loved ones.”